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RACE SEGREGATION IN CITIES
A general zoning ordinance provided that the city should
be divided into districts or zones, some being assigned to the
Negro race, the others to the White race. It also provided that
members of each race should be prohibited from using or occupy-
ing buildings in the district designated for the other. The facts
show that the districts assigned to the different races were fairly
located and equitably apportioned. By an amendment changing
some of the boundaries, plaintiff's houses, which were formerly
in the negro district and which were leased to negroes, one of
whom is a party plaintiff, were now in the white district.
Plaintiffs instituted suit against the municipal authorities to
restrain them from enforcing the ordinance. It was held that
the enforcement of the statute would result in the taking of
property without due process of law, and thus in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem,
6 S.E. (2d) 867 (N.C. 1940).
The basis of the decision in the principal case is the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its clear impli-
cation of the right to use and dispose of property without
unreasonable interference from the state.' Yet the case is not as
free from question as the opinion of the court would lead one
to believe. 2 One cannot categorically say that the use and dis-
position of property can never be lawfully interfered with.
3
There are instances to the contrary found in cases of zoning ordi-
nances.
Lombardo v. City of Dallas4 involves a situation where a
zoning ordinance classifying plaintiff's property for dwelling
See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 74 (1917), "Property is
more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that
it includes the right to acquire, use and dispose of it"; Booth v. Illinois,
184 U. S. 425 (1901); Bruce v. Strickland, "The jus disponend! is an
important element of property, and a vested right protected by the
clause In the Federal Constitution, which declares the obligation of con-
tract invoidable."
I For reasons why race segregation might be constitutional, see
Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, (1934) 32 Mich. L. R.
721-731.
3 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1862).
447 S. W. (2d) 495 (1932); see also In Re Opinion of Justices,
234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920); Streett v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698,
291 S. W. 494 (1927); Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (1891).
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purposes, which property could be more profitably used for a
filling station. It was held not to deny due process. In State
ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. MoDonald,5 the court said: "It fol-
lows necessarily that the village was vested with authority to
remove any business or trade from the district and to fix a limit
of time in which the same shall be done". These are examples
just as surely of interfering with the use and disposition of
property as is the enforcement of the Winston-Salem ordinance.
Yet they are permitted while the other is not. More concretely,
in the case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 appellee
owned sixty-eight acres of land situated in the western end of the
village. It was especially adapted for industrial uses. For such
uses it had a market value of about $10,000 per acre. A zoning
ordinance placed this tract in a residential section, the result
of which was to cause the market value to be not in excess of
$2,500, per acre. The total loss to the owner was approximately
$510,000. The ordinance was held to be valid.
In the light of these cases it might be asked: Why is the
Winston-Salem ordinance not within the permissive limits of the
Fourteenth Amendment? On first impression one might give two
possible answers: First, it is often said the law recognizes no
distinction between the races, and since the ordinance is based
solely on this ground, it lacks a reasonable classification. Second,
enforcement of the ordinance would result in state interference
with the right to use and dispose of property. The first answer
is untenable as will be seen by a brief review of pertinent
cases.
In Plessy v. Ferguson,7 a "Jim Crow" statute was involved
which required railroad companies in Louisiana to provide
separate but equal accommodations for negro and white, by pro-
viding two coaches for each train. The statute was held con-
stitutional.8 This case exemplifies the realization that the law
does recognize that there is a distinction between the races;
not that one is superior to the other, but that there are innate
*168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1920).
*272 U. S. 365 (1926).
163 U. S. 537 (1896).
'Laws for the separation of white and colored in trains are ix
force in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Virginia.
NOTES
differences of which the law can properly take cognizance. This
distinction has been recognized also in cases where laws separat-
ing the races in schools have been upheld.9 In the "Jim Crow"
case, as in the principal case, it should be noted that the law
required equal and fair treatment with respect to each race.' 0
So it seems there is not such discrimination in the Winston-
Salem ordinance as to contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court, in Bitchavan v. Warley," distinguishes the "Jim
Crow" cases from the cases of segregation in cities, saying that
in the former no property rights are threatened, while in the
latter they are:' 2
The second answer, namely, state interference with private
property, is the one upon which the court relies. Yet it is open
to some doubt.13 Segregation ordinances have been sustained
by the court of last resort in a few states. In Louisiana,' 4 a
municipal ordinance, which prohibited whites or blacks from
establishing residences or places of abode in certain districts
without the written consent of the inhabitants of the area, if a
majority thereof were persons of the orpposite race, has been
held not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but merely to
show a recognition of the social distinction between the races.
Similar results were reached in Harden v. City of Atlanta'5 and
Hopkins v. City of Richmond.'6  Since the question involves the
Federal Constitution, however, the final authority is with the
Supreme Court, which authority has clearly and definitely been
exercised in the Buchanan Case. The court said colored per-
' See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927); Berea College v. Ken-
tucky, 211 U. S. 537 (1904); Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198
(Mass. 1849); State v. McCann et al., 21 Ohio St. Rep. 198 (1891).
Laws for the separation of the negro and white in schools are in force
In Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Lodiisi-
ana, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vir-
ginia and West Virginia.
"In McCabe v. Atchison, Etc., R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 (1914) (A stat-
ute permitted train companies to furnish dining cars for white and to
refuse colored without furnishing them diners, held, opposed to the
Fourteenth Amendment). In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 59
S. Ct. 232 (1938), the Court held it was error to refuse negroes in white
schools in Missouri, since no provisions were made for negro schools.
n245 U. S. 60 (1917).
2
2 This distinction is criticized, however, in (1917) 16 Mich. L. R. 109.
'1 See Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation
Ordinances, (1927) 33 W. Va. L. Q. 332, 343.
"Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925).
15 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917).I0 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915).
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sons have the right to use and dispose of their property with-
out laws discriminating against them solely on account of color.
'Whether the court is leaning over backwards in order to protect
the negro is a question raised by various sources.17 At any rate
it stands out as being, at present, decisive on the question under
discussion. It may be noted that of the three eases just
mentioned contrary to the Buchanan Case only one, Tyler v.
Harmon, was decided after the Buchanan Case and that that case,
on appeal to the Supreme Court, was reversed on the authority
of the Buchanan Case without opinion.' 8 And since the federal
decision, Jackson v. State,' 9 and recently Clinard v. Wivston-
Salem, have yielded to the federal decision.
The answer that the Winston-Salem ordinance is invalid
because it results in interference with property rights is too
general to distinguish the holding of the principal case from the
holding of the somewhat similar situation involved in Realty
Co. v. McDonald, supra, for example, where state interference
was permitted.20 What, then, is the precise distinction? Briefly,
it is the difference of degree of public good to be gained from
the statutes.
Some of the reasons given for separating business and resi-
dences are :21 (1) Promotion of health and security from injury
to children and others. In upholding an ordinance prohibiting
brick kilns within the limits of Omaha, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska2 2 argued that it was offensive, because of the produc-
tion of smoke and dust; also because it was an inviting place for
tramps in cold weather who might be turned loose on the residents
in the neighborhood where police protection is frequently inade-
quate. (2) Preservation of property value. The city of Niagra
falls23 passed an ordinance prohibiting any factory within a
prescribed residence area without the consent of adjacent
property owners. This ordinance was upheld on the grounds
27 See Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation
Ordinances, (1927) 33 W. Va. L. Q., supra n. 13 at 343; Martin, Segrega-
tion of Residences of Negoes, (1934) 32 Mich. L. R., supra n. 2, at
730-731.
I Tyler v. Harmon, supra n. 14.
'g 132 Md. 311, 103 Atl. 912 (1918).
See note in 54 A. I R. 1016, 1026 (1928).
See Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Prop-
erty, (1925) 9 Minn. L. R. 593, 613-620.
Krittenbrink v. Withnell, 91 Neb. 101, 135 N. W. 376 (1912).
1In Re Russell, 158 N. Y. S. 162 (1916).
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that a factory would greatly impair the value of property in
this section and seriously interfere with the proper enjoyment
in the purposes to which it had been heretofore devoted.
(3) Facilitating the extinguishment of fires. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts 24 upheld the exclusion of all buildings
dealing with businesses from a residence district in these words:
"The suppression and prevention of disorder, the extinguishment
of fire . . ., may be facilitated by establishment of zones or
districts for business as distinguished from residences." In
Ex Parte Montgomery,2 5 it was held that because of the
inflammable nature of the materials kept in a lumber yard, the
ordinance separating businesses and residences should be upheld.
(4) Expediency and prevention of disorder. Heavy industrial
districts are intended for industries of the nuisance character,
such as require large blocks, wide streets and an expensive spread
of buildings and yards. It is expedient, therefore, to concentrate
the heavy businesses into one locality in order to obtain the
optimum of efficiency. 26 (5) Aestheticism. Although aestheti-
cism, alone, has not generally been accepted as a valid reason for
zoning, it has no doubt been a contributing factor in a large num-
ber of cases. It is said in State ex rel. Twin City Building Co. v.
Houghton,27 "It is time the courts recognize the aesthetic as a
factor in life". ir. McQuillin 28 says "It (aesthetic considera-
tion) is destined to increase with the years, and in the develop-
ment of the law in this respect, courts will be inclined to give a
broader interpretation to such regulations, and finally sanction
restrictions imposed solely to advance materially attractiveness
and artistic beauty".
There was an attempt in the Louisville ordinance29 to show
sufficient public interest by making the preamble read as fol-
, In Re Opinion of Justices, supra n. 4.
2 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pas. 1070 (1912).
21 Gist and Halbert, Urban Society (1933), 654, "Zoning is an
attempt to displace chaos with orderliness, to substitute public control
for the laissez faire ideal of free and open competition with its social
and economic waste". See also Young, City Planning and Restrictions
on the Use of Property, (1925) 9 Minn. L. R., supra n. 21, at 611.
1^7144 Minn. 1, 170 N. W. 885 (1919); see also State ex rel., Civillo v.
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Baker, Municipal Aesthet-
ics and the Law, (1926) 20 Ill. L. R. 546.
'III McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1912) 929.
' Set out in 165 Ky. 560-564; see the Standard State Enabling
Act which advises state legislatures to adopt the following as section
one of the act delegating the powers to zone to the cities: "Grant of
K. L. J.-6
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lows: "An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between
the white and colored races in the city of Louisville". Yet the
Supreme Court, in passing on the ordinance in the Buchanan
Case, after admitting there "exists a serious and difficult prob-
lem arising from a feeling hostility", found there was not suf-
ficient public interest, based solely upon color, to warrant state
interference with private property.
There are, however, certain advantages in separating negroes
and whites. According to Mr. Hott,3o "Commingling of the
homes and places of abode of white men and black men gives
rise to unnecessary provocation for miscegenation, race riots,
lynchings, and other forms of social malaise, existent where a
child-like, undisciplined, inferior race is living in close contact
with a people of more mature civilization". Segregation of the
two races would tend toward the following advantages:
(1) Racial antipathies would be lessened.31 Because of dif-
ferences between the races, resulting from different cultural
backgrounds 32 and different physical make-ups, a natural
prejudice prevents harmony.33 By keeping one separated from
the other it follows that the prejudice will manifest itself less
frequently.8 4  (2) Each race would be more at ease-the white
power. For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of the city and incorpo-
rated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories, and size of buildings, and other structures, the per-
centage of the lot that may be occupied, the size of the yards, courts,
and open spaces, the density of the population, and the location aid
use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence
or other purposes."
3 Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation Ordi-
nances, (1927) 33 W. Va. L. Q. 332, supra n. 13.
nSee Literary Digest, Sept. 7 (1935) 18: The heads of the Mary-
land school system informed the court in their appeal that the bi-racial
school system "undoubtedly has been a leading cause of the present
amicable and cooperative relations which exist in the state betwden
the races."
"North, Social Problems and Social Planning (1932) 256, "The
cultural level of the great majority of negroes is, however, the principal
factor in the white's attitude (toward the negro)".
"I4. at 152, "When races meet the difference in physical appear-
ance and the difference in culture induce a strong consciousness of
unlikeness. . . . This consciousness carries with it a natural antipa-
thy or repugnance which members of all groups inevitably feel toward
those of another whose appearance and culture are different."
14 King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 38, 448, 45 Am. Rep. 232 (1883), "The
attempt to impose social intimacy and intercourse between the races
by legal enactments, would probably tend only to embitter the preju-
dices . . . which exist between them and to produce an evil instead
of a good result."
NOTES
because it has a distaste for the colored, and the colored because
it would feel less imposed upon and more independent. This,
no doubt, is one of the important elements prompting various
legislatures to enact laws separating the races in trains, schools
and cities. (3) Because of this feeling of independence the
negro, as a race, would be more progressive. There would be
greater incentive for him to move forward in that he would feel
he was improving his own castle rather than that of the white
man.35  Mr. Shannon says36 that with segregation "all would
have better opportunity to develop along normal lines, toward
racial self-sufficiency, racial self-respect, and racial self-
reliance. . . .". (4) There would be less miscegenation. West
Chester R.R. Co. v. Miles37 states that commingling of the races
even on street cars was pernicious for the very reason that "the
tendency of intimate social intermixture is to amalgamation con-
trary to the law of races." In early American history, danger
to racial integrity was realized and laws passed to prevent it.38
To reach a categorical conclusion from these analyses is, of
course, impossible. The most that can be said is that the Supreme
Court, so far, has found that the value to be derived from segre-
gation is slight; at least not so great as to warrant state inter-
ference with the right to use and dispose of property. Just what
effect the several segregation laws, promulgated by the senti-
ment of the people, will have upon the Supreme Court in the
future, cannot be predicted with certainty. There was nothing
the North Carolina court could do, with propriety, in the face
of the Buchanan Case, but fall in line with its decision.
M.AJoR GARDNEr,
See Reuter, The American Race Problem (1927), Chapter XVI,
"The Growth of Race Consciousness."
"The Racial Integrity of the American Negro (1925) 47-48.
,'55 Pa. St. 209 (1867).
SSee Reuter, The American Race Problem (1927), supra, n. 35,
at 126.
